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Abstract
In the last decade we have witnessed the explosive growth of online social net-
working services (SNSs) such as Facebook, Twitter, RenRen and LinkedIn.
While SNSs provide diverse benefits for example, forstering inter-personal re-
lationships, community formations and news propagation, they also attracted
uninvited nuiance. Spammers abuse SNSs as vehicles to spread spams rapidly
and widely. Spams, unsolicited or inappropriate messages, significantly impair
the credibility and reliability of services. Therefore, detecting spammers has be-
come an urgent and critical issue in SNSs. This paper deals with Follow spam
in Twitter. Instead of spreading annoying messages to the public, a spammer
follows (subscribes to) legitimate users, and followed a legitimate user. Based
on the assumption that the online relationships of spammers are different from
those of legitimate users, we proposed classification schemes that detect follow
spammers. Particularly, we focused on cascaded social relations and devised
two schemes, TSP-Filtering and SS-Filtering, each of which utilizes Triad Sig-
nificance Profile (TSP) and Social status (SS) in a two-hop subnetwork centered
at each other. We also propose an emsemble technique, Cascaded-Filtering, that
combine both TSP and SS properties. Our experiments on real Twitter datasets
demonstrated that the proposed three approaches are very practical. The pro-
posed schemes are scalable because instead of analyzing the whole network, they
inspect user-centered two hop social networks. Our performance study showed
that proposed methods yield significantly better performance than prior scheme
in terms of true positives and false positives.
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1. Introduction
The use of social networking services (SNSs) continues to grow exponentially
with the widespread adoption of smart devices such as smart phones, smart
pads, smart watches, and so on. SNSs can connect people and can be used
to share information in real time. SNSs such as Facebook, Twitter, and Ren-
Ren are becoming the most influential mediums for building social relations,
as well as for the sharing and propagation of information. According to recent
announcement, Twitter, one of the largest and the most popular SNSs, passed
255m monthly active users and expects 80% of advertising revenue from mobile
users1
After repeated explosive growth in user population, matured SNSs such as
Facebook and Twitter become a necessings in modern life in developed countries.
In addition, relatively new SNSs such as RenRen and Sina Weibo, targeted for
specific country or language speakers, replicate the eruptive expansion of the
earlier SNSs. For example, an influential user can be exploited by a person
working in online marketing to maximize the marketing effect; malicious users
(attackers) disseminate false information or fraudulent messages for the purpose
of phishing, scam, or malware intrusion. That is, the attackers post multiple un-
related messages with trending topics to attract legitimate users and encourage
them to click the malicious links in the messages.
Spam refers to unwanted messages from unknown sources (attackers). One
of the major negative aspects of SNS is spam. In the early Internet era, spam
appeared in emails or SMS (short message service). However, the domain of
spam expanded into SNS as the popularity and usage of the services continued
to increase. False information from SNS can spread rapidly in real time. Follow
spam was reported recently and is a system that tries to increase the number
of relations (or friendships) in users networks for the purpose of sending spam
via SNS. The attack pattern of the follow spam begins with the attacker dis-
seminating spammer accounts that follow a large number of legitimate users for
the purpose of receiving a follow-back or drawing attention to the spam account
[15]. Due to the consequent exposure of the public to spam content, this practice
definitely lowers the reliability of SNS.
In practice, Twitter has experienced Follow spam problems, reducing users
trust in message distribution and increasing computation overhead. In 2008,
Twitter officially announced that Follow spam accounts had followed so many
people that they threatened the performance of the entire system 2. Even
with the emerging threat from Follow spam, it has been barely investigated or
researched. A contents-based spam filtering approach is employed in the Twitter
spam field [12, 5, 28, 42]. However, since spam contents keep changing to avoid
content-based detection by inserting URLs and images in spam messages, the
contents-based approach is vulnerable against evolving message patterns. To
1http://thenextweb.com/twitter/2014/04/29/twitter-passes-255m-monthly-active-users-
198m-mobile-users-sees-80-advertising-revenue-mobile/
2https://blog.twitter.com/2008/making-progress-on-spam
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overcome the limitations of the content-based approach, a new approach using
inherent properties of SNS was introduced.
[15] first emphasized that Follow spam should be detected by using its link-
farming property. They proposed a PageRank-based ranking algorithm to lower
the impact of spammers. However, this approach can be burdensome since it
needs to utilize social network data for the entire network (i.e., all informa-
tion for nodes and edges). Therefore, it has a high computational cost and can
barely detect Follow spammers in real time. As a result, a novel detection mech-
anism with low computational cost and real time spam filtering is needed while
maintaining the detection performance. In this paper, we suggest two social
network-based detection schemes for countering Twitter spam. First, spammer
accounts are filtered out with the use of a Triad Significance Profile (TSP) that
measures the structural differences between the frequencies of 13 isomorphic
subgraphs. We discovered that TSP of a spammer account is different from
that of a legitimate users account with only 2-hop social networks. According
to our experiment, 92.1% of spammers are classified correctly when we used
only TSP features for classification. This result suggests that frequency and
distribution of isomorphic subgraphs could be informative features for identify-
ing spammers. Secondly, we introduce a new detection approach using the social
status (SS) theory [27] to distinguish spammer accounts. Legitimate users typi-
cally follow accounts of a higher status than themselves, whereas spammers are
likely to follow in a random manner. With these approaches, we can confirm
that cascaded social network-based approaches (TSP and SS) can effectively
detect Follow spammers with a low cost.
Our experiments on real Twitter datasets clearly show that our three mech-
anisms, TSP-Filtering, SS-Filtering and Cascaded-Filtering, are very practical
for the following reasons. First, our approaches require only a small user-related
2-hop neighborhood social network. Actually, there are only few existing works
focused on small neighborhood graph in other areas [30, 1], but none of them
discovered the power of neighborhood social network clearly. Therefore, they
can be applied to spam detection systems in social networks as real time solu-
tions. Second, service providers can maintain the credibility and reliability of
their SNSs by applying our approaches. Legitimate users are less likely to be
blocked by the system with low false positives (5.7%). Also, a high proportion
of true positives (96.3%) provides a secure environment to users.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• For the first time, we discovered the feasibility of cascaded social infor-
mation such as triad (or isomorphic subgraph) and social status based
positive link probability as good features for classifying spammers and
legitimate users in Twitter;
• Our approaches involve more lightweight computation for real time spam
detection than the previous scheme (i.e., global information). Since to
check whether a certain user is spammer or not, we only focused on the
2-hop social networks of each user (i.e., local information). and extract
cascaded social information from the network;
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• Based on Twitter’s spam policy, novel triad graph based features and
social status theory based features are proposed and cascaded together to
facilitate spam detection;
• To the best of our knowledge, our approaches are the first experiments
with real world data to provide the credible and reliable Twitter system
with true positive results of up to 96.3%. We believe that our findings
can provide valuable insights to the area of spam detection and defense in
various social networks;
• To sum up, this paper is the first work which clarify the difference be-
tween spammer and legitimate user in the view of subgraph consisting of
neighborhood. Moreover, we suggest the novel three approaches such as
TSP-Filtering, SS-Filtering and Cascaded-Filtering for the follow spam
detection based on cascaded social information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Firstly, we introduce interest-
ing related works on twitter spam and spam detection mechanisms in section
2. Then, to describe our approach, we introduce the motivation for our work
in section 3. Then, we propose the TSP-Filtering and SS-Filtering methods
with the respective performance evaluation in section 4 and section 5. In Sec-
tion 6, we propose Cascaded-Filtering with higher true positive and lower false
positive than TSP-Filtering and SS-Filtering. Section 7 presents an overall eval-
uation and discussion of our three approaches (TSP-Filtering, SS-Filtering and
Cascaded-Filtering) and Collusionrank [15]. Lastly, we close this paper with
future work and the conclusion in section 8 and 9.
2. Related work
2.1. Twitter-spam Filtering
2.1.1. Content based Twitter-spam Filtering
Twitter contents such as user profile, tweets, and the activity log provide
various options for distinguishing spammers from legitimate users. Spammers
generally write tweets that contain a hashtag and URL according to the following
research studies that analyzed commonly used hashtags and URL: [12, 5, 28, 42].
COMPA [12] detected compromised accounts that wrote spam tweets based
on the tweeting language of the user’s account, the tweeting time window, the
URL, and the “mention” receiver. This is a personalized detection approach
that learns the previous behavioral pattern of each user. Benevenuto et al.
[5] and Martinez-Romo et al. [28] proposed classification models that learned
the number of hashtags and URLs [5] or spam URLs that are used in spam
groundtruth tweets. Yardi et al. [42] studied spammers’ strategic behavioral
patterns and also concluded that the use of hashtags related to trending topics
is a very effective spamming strategy. Gao et al. [14] built a template based on
the sentence structure of spam groundtruth tweets and used template matching
to filter out spam tweets.
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2.1.2. Social-network based Twitter-spam Filtering
As the attack strategies of Twitter spammers have become more effective,
a variety of social-network-based Twitter-spam-detection approaches have been
introduced.
Twitter spammers attempt to convince the public that their accounts are
legitimate or famous, and they display their spam tweets to the public. It
is easier for spammers to attract user interest by exploiting as much social
information as possible. Previous works identified follower-market customers
who purchased fake accounts that they used to follow themselves [22, 34]. Jiang
et al. [22] analyzed the behavioral synchronicity among these fake accounts to
detect their presence. Stringhini et al. [34] examined real follower markets and
detected fake accounts by identifying those for which the number of followees
increased suddenly but did not decrease any further. Viswanath et al. [36] used
Principal component analysis (PCA), an anomaly-detection approach, to detect
intentional “follow” or “like” behaviors from market customers.
On Twitter, Follow spam (or link farming) refers to the act of following
a mass number of people to garner attention or follow-backs3. Ghosh et al.
[15] pointed out that most Follow spammers attained a higher rank in existing
ranking algorithms because their reciprocal-follower rate is 82%. Based on their
findings, they proposed the application of Collusionrank.
2.1.3. Subnetwork based Spam Filtering
The authors of [37] directly crawled Twitter’s data and analyzed them with
both contents and social graph modeling based approaches. Based on analysis
of the contents, categorized into legitimates and spams, they proved that their
proposed reputation feature has the best performance among all social graph-
based features for detecting abnormal behaviors. However, they only considered
the relationship between outdegrees and indegrees in a simple Twitter graph for
the proposed reputation feature. Even though this scheme also utilizes a small
graph (subgraph), a sophisticated graph design is as only part of the triad ap-
proach. The authors of [30] used neighborhood subnetwork (i.e., ego network)
to detect comment spammers in Youtube. They also utilized selected discrim-
inating motifs and analyzed them in Youtube video-user relation network. It
seems very similar with our work, but it used spam campaign related motifs.
Therefore, it cannot distinguish spammers when they use other sophisticated
strategy. [1] extracted weighted subgraphs from target network and utilizes
them as discriminating features to detect spammers. It also analyzed subgraphs
by types of anomalies. Based on power law characteristic of social network, it
compared spammer to legitimate users neighborhood subnetwork in terms of
edge or weight distribution.
3https://blog.twitter.com/2008/making-progress-spam/
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2.2. Link spam Filtering
Link spam has been widely studied in the web spam detection field. This
type of spam is presented as numerous links from a large number of web pages
to a few target web pages. Studies on Link spam have been receiving attention
due to the limitations of PageRank [31] and HITS [24]. Thanks to significant
link characteristics, many web link graph structure-based spam detection ap-
proaches have been introduced [18, 40, 25, 3, 41, 8]. TrustRank [18] is one
of the most popular Link spam detection algorithms. It propagates the ’non-
spam’ label through social networks. Likewise, BadRank [40] propagates the
’spam’ label through social networks. Compared to PageRank [31], these two
algorithms utilize ’non-spam’ and ’spam’ label propagation to lower the rank
of spam webpages. [4] proposed an advanced Link spam detection algorithm
using both ’spam’ and ’non-spam’ label propagation. These label propagation
algorithms require seed knowledge such as a set of spam nodes and a set of
non-spam nodes. Therefore, noise in the initial dataset can be a critical issue
for these algorithms.
2.3. Sybil Detection
Most SNS spam detection systems rely on Sybil detection algorithms. Peer-
to-peer systems consist of multiple nodes with several connections (edges). The
system has to ensure that each node is clearly identified; otherwise, a malicious
user (Sybil) can attempt to create multiple fake identities masquerading as
honest nodes [11]. They can then manipulate the system (by zombie machines)
or attack the system in order to gain illegal profit such as positive feedback in
the reputation system, getting more votes in internet polls, or targeting sites to
increase their rank in Google PageRank.
There are two main approaches to the Sybil attack: centralized and de-
centralized. Centralized defense obtains admission control through a central
authority. Decentralized defense has no trusted central authority and controls
the IP address by binding an identity. For the decentralized attack, SybilGuard
[44] proposes that when each node receives
√
k independent samples from a set
of honest nodes of size k, a random walk can be performed to try to discover the
Sybil identities by using the intersection probability between honest and Sybil
groups. The number of available attack edges in Sybil are theoretically bound
O(
√
k log k). SybilLimit [43] is an enhanced method introduced by [44]. They
reduced the attack edge bound in near optimal O(log k) by exploiting various
random walk methods. GateKeeper [35] adapts the ticket distribution algorithm
to obtain each node’s probability of Sybil/honest users.
Secondly, the centralized method. SybilInfer [10] assumed that the central
authority knows the entire social network. After random walks, each node
is assigned a Sybil/honest probability by measuring the Bayesian inference.
SybilDefender [39] assumed that when starting a random walk in Sybil nodes,
it will pass the intersection between honest and Sybil nodes. These approaches
apply community detection algorithms to find Sybil communities. SumUp [35]
addresses the vote aggregation problem by considering each voter’s trust graph
and calculating a set of max-flow paths from all voters.
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Currently, there are many Sybil detecting methods with various social net-
work properties. SybilRank [6] investigates each node by assuming that honest
nodes will have higher degree-normalized landing probability. A random walk
is performed to measure the ranking to determine whether the account is Sybil
or not. SybilShield [33] utilizes a multi-community social network structure
environment, considering sociological properties to cut the edge between hon-
est and Sybil groups, performing modified random walks and figuring out the
properties of multi-hop edges. SybilBelief [16] detects Sybil nodes based on a
semi-supervised learning framework. This method modifies the Loopy Belief
propagation system and the pairwise Markov random field to define each node’s
classification (Sybil/honest).
2.4. Data Mining Approach for spam detection
In spam detection problem, most of existing studies related the problem to
classification task as follows. In general, spam classifier firstly learn features
extracted from SNS using pattern of legitimate users such as the number of
followees/followers, post uploading time and contents information of user profile
and posts. Then, classifier determines if newly given test user is spammer or
legitimate user by comparing to learned pattern. Therefore, if the test users
behavioral pattern feature is far from legitimate users pattern feature (learned
feature), the classifier could classify and detect the user as spammer. In some
cases, classifiers adopt classification threshold to handle the tradeoff between
true positive and false positive. Since reliability and credibility is crucial in
using SNS, low false positive is treated particularly according to spam detection
system.
In detail, [23] used linear regression for classifying and detecting spammers
and it stated that deviant users from legitimate users patterns could be classified
as spammers. Similarly, [36] utilized PCA (Principal Component Analysis) and
it detected Facebook spammers who are distant from the principal component of
legitimate users. Also, Markov random field based spam classification approach
was proposed in [13]. Especially, contents-based spam detection approaches
largely used Nave bayes classifier or SVM classifier with contents-related fea-
tures. In the early stage of spam detection, [17, 21] and many similar studies
analyzed token or word in spam contents and applied extracted features to the
Nave bayes classifier. [32] proposed optimized version of SVM spam classifier
and achieved efficiency than previous ones. [45] relieved false positive problem
by adopting boundary region to classification result. Since most of spam classifi-
cation is binary classification of spam and non-spam, ternary classification gives
three classification labels including boundary region which means reconsidering
region.
3. Motivation
3.1. Web, Social Network and Twitter
Like the Web, where the importance of each page is largely determined by
who references whom, the influence of individuals on many SNSs is determined
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by the number of indexes they receive. For example, the number of followers is
the most important factor on Twitter and determines social capital, while the
number of “likes” on Facebook is similar. This feature, however, has attracted
a plethora of frauds who try to increase the importance or reputation of enti-
ties by generating bogus indexes, leading to the definition of the spamdexing
class of attacks. Twitter’s size has expanded exponentially over the past several
years and it now has over 255 million active users after a succession of rapid
growth spurts that resulted in an average annual growth rate of 25% 4. No-
tably, the social-interaction structure of Twitter is very interesting. Users can
follow famous persons–usually celebrities or standout opinion leaders–that they
are unacquainted with, as well as close friends. Therefore, Twitter plays an
information-propagation role in addition to the role of an online social network
[26].
More importantly, contrary to the Web, Facebook, and many other social
networks where spam indexes usually originate from fake accounts and from a
circle of colluding link farms, a malicious person can collect followers or fans
from innocent, social-capital-conscious users on Twitter. Further, the high rate
of follow-backs makes the detection of Twitter spammers more difficult because
they receive many legitimate followers just by following target users [15]. Exist-
ing link-farm-detection methods well fitted for web spam detection field therefore
lose much of their effectiveness in the detection of spamdexing on Twitter.
In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of a cascaded SNS-based secu-
rity scheme to detect Follow spam. Different from the unpractical and heuristic
approaches of previous works, with the characteristics of follow-backs we apply
triad frequencies and status theory for the first time in our Follow spam detec-
tion scheme. Note that the main purpose of this study is not the attainment of
engineering optimization for the performance enhancement of prior schemes, but
rather, it is the examination of the feasibility of a social-network-based security
scheme in a popular online social networking site, i.e. Twitter.
Before we formalize the problem, we address the characteristics of Twitter.
All 13 types of directed social graph models and social status with local informa-
tion can be observed in Twitter. Additionally, Twitter has well-defined social
relations in the form of the “follower” and “friend” relationships. In addition
to these characteristics, spams show up frequently in Twitter. We practically
exploit the policy of Twitter against spams to design our proposed scheme.
Twitter’s spam policy is summarized as follows:
• “If you have a small number of followers compared to the amount of people
you are following”, the account may be considered a spam account.
• “Multiple duplicate updates on one account” is a factor used to detect
spam.
4http://thenextweb.com/twitter/2014/04/29/twitter-passes-255m-monthly-active-users-
198m-mobile-users-sees-80-advertising-revenue-mobile/
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• “If your updates consist mainly of links, and not personal updates”, it is
considered spam.
First policy is related with the social-interaction structure of Twitter while
second and third policies have to do with spam contents. Most previous works
focused on contents analysis or full information usage of social networks with
a high amount of computational overhead. Different from previous approaches
considering second and third policies, we accurately detect Follow spam using
only local information of the social-interaction structure of Twitter. That is,
our cascaded social network scheme is applicable regardless of the content such
as Tweet, time and links.
3.2. Link spam and Follow spam
The concept of link farming originated from Web spam. The intent of link
and Follow spam is to increase the population of a specific (target) website or
reputation. Since normal search engines (e.g., Google) place popular websites on
the first page, link-farming websites create numerous links to the target website.
PageRank [31], the most popular website ranking algorithm, ranks websites
based on the indegree of the site. Actually, the popularity of inlink nodes is
also important, but numerous inlinks are likely to increase the target website’s
ranking. Therefore, link farms generally contain plural links, and the links are
created from many nodes to a few target nodes.
Follow spam, a special attack strategy on Twitter, has been shown to be a
link farming technique. Figure 1 shows an example of Follow spam.
Figure 1: Overview of Follow spam
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Table 1: Twitter dataset
The number of total users The number of spammers
54,981,152 41,352
Follow spam consists of numerous links, but some differences exist. First,
links are created by a few spammer nodes and they target many legitimate user
nodes. More specifically, original link spam denotes many spammer nodes-few
legitimate nodes relationship while Follow spam denotes few spammer nodes-
many legitimate nodes. Second, the purpose of Follow spam is not just linking,
but receiving a follow-back (reciprocal link). A user on Twitter can see tweets
(contents) from another user when he/she follows (subscribe) the other’s ac-
count. Consequently, spammers need to be followed by other users to show
their spamming contents such as URL, image and advertisement.
Therefore, to gain more followers and attention, spammers send a large num-
ber of follow links to legitimate users. Surprisingly, the majority of followers
who Follow spam accounts have been previously targeted by spam accounts. To
be specific, 82% of legitimate users send a follow-back to spammers [15]. If s
is a spammer account and his/her outlinks are all attack edges for follow back,
the attack strength of s (AS(s)) is defined in (1). We defined the ratio between
successful follow spam links (follow back links) of spammer s (Nfb(s)) and total
follow spam links of s (Nf (s)) as AS(s) as follows :
AS(s) = Nfb(s)/Nf (s) (1)
In (1), Nf (s) has the same meaning of outdegree of s. Therefore, the attack
strength (AS(s)) of follow spam relies on a successful number of follow backs.
3.3. Twitter Dataset and Collusionrank
We conducted an experiment with a large-scale Twitter-follow link dataset
that was provided by MPI-SWS [9]. This dataset was collected in September
2009, contains 1,963,263,821 directed social links, and the number of corre-
sponding users is 54,981,152. We also used the Follow spammer dataset from
[15] that contains 41,352 spammers as the ground truth.
Table 1 shows Twitter dataset used in our experiment.
We compared the performance of the proposed method with that of Col-
lusionrank [15] presented in WWW 2012. Collusionrank lowers the influence
scores of users who connect to spammers and filter out those users who gain
high rankings by link farming. It is a user-ranking algorithm based on PageR-
ank. Since we used the same dataset as Collusionrank, we compare the perfor-
mance of the proposed method with the true positive and false positive results
of Collusionrank. According to [15], Collusionrank detected 94% of the 41,352
spammers that appeared in the last low ranking scores 10% of ranking positions;
consequently, we could extract the false positives of legitimate users (9.9%) from
Collusionrank with a detection threshold of 10%. We reiterate that the detailed
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Table 2: Performance estimation of Collusionrank [15]
True Positive False Positive
Spammer 94.0% 6.0%
Legitimate user 90.1% 9.9%
Table 3: Average indegree and outdegree
Average indegree Average outdegree
Spammer 303.6 866.5
Legitimate user 401.5 462.0
performance of Collusionrank is not described in [15], except for the true posi-
tives for spammers within the threshold of the last 10%. Table 2 is the estimated
performance of CollusionRank from a true positive value of 94%.
Collusionrank has good performance in terms of true positive and false pos-
itive, but it has some limitations as follows:
First, it needs to analyze every node and edge in a social network. The
PageRank-based algorithm typically estimates every node’s reputation or rank-
ing depending on the reputation of other nodes and edge formation. However,
to classify spammers, computing ranks on every node is not practical. In real
SNSs, spammers disseminate spamming contents simultaneously. Therefore, a
real time spam filtering approach is more effective; fast spam filtering signifi-
cantly decreases the number of victims of spam. As such, analyzing all social
network information is not very pragmatic.
Second, it has a high proportion of false positives in detecting legitimate
users. If 9.9% of legitimate user accounts in Twitter were blocked, most peo-
ple would stop using Twitter. A high number of true positives in detecting
spammers is also crucial; but the credibility and reliability of the service are
maintained by keeping the number of false positives low.
In the following sections, we propose cascaded social information-based spam
detection mechanisms that overcome the limitations of Collusionrank.
3.4. Indegree and Outdegree of Sample dataset
Since Follow spam has a link farming property that involves creating many
outlinks, we should investigate whether spammers in Twitter have a higher
outdegree than legitimate users. Also, based on Twitter’s spam policy, we focus
on the ratio of the indegree to the outdegree for both legitimate users and
spammers.
In this paper, we use randomly selected 1,000 legitimate users and 1,000
spammers as the experimental dataset. We determined a large enough sample
size with a 95% confidence level and 5% confidence interval.
Table 3 is the average indegree and outdegree of legitimate users and spam-
mers.
Inevitably, spammers tend to have approximately two times as many out-
degrees as legitimate users. The most interesting observation is that the ratio
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Table 4: Performance evaluation using only indegree and outdegree
Classifier Type True Positive False Positive
J48
Spammer 83.9% 16.1%
Legitimate user 80.7% 19.3%
RandomForest
Spammer 80.8% 19.2%
Legitimate user 80.4% 19.6%
between the average indegree and outdegree shows significant differences be-
tween legitimate users and spammers. The average indegree and outdegree of
legitimate users are similar and the ratio between the two is 0.86. However, the
ratio between the average indegree and outdegree of spammers is 0.35. This
indicates that the indegree and outdegree could be roughly informative for clas-
sifying spammers.
To classify spammers by only indegree and outdegree, we used J48 and
RandomForest classifiers built in Weka5. Both algorithms are decision tree
based classifiers. While J48 generates only one decision tree, RandomForest
corrects overfitting problems by constructing multiple decision trees during the
training process. Table 4 is the classification performance evaluation using only
indegree and oudegree.
As mentioned in the Twitter spam policy, we proved that the number of
outdegrees can be a highly useful feature for spam classification. However,
comparison using only the number of degree types between Follow spams and
legitimate users is not enough of a performance measure to inspect spammers
as shown in Table 4. To make up for the spam detection issue, we tried to apply
TSP and SS as described in section 4 and 5.
4. Twitter-spam Detection with Triad Significance Profile
4.1. Follow Spam Detection with Triad Significance Profile (TSP-Filtering)
A prior study showed that, interestingly, several types of networks from
different fields such as biology and the social sciences share common properties.
In particular, [29] showed that some of the 13 isomorphic triad types are over-
represented while some are under-represented. To the best of our knowledge, we
first used this fact to discern Twitter Follow spam. In terms of a social graph,
a user is a node and a follow from a person to another person is a directed link
from the follower (the person) to the followee (another person). Figure 2 shows
the 13 isomorphic triad classes introduced by [38].
Note that a Follow spammer inevitably generates many follows (directed
links) to receive follow-backs (redirected links). For each spammer, we found
all of the corresponding triads and counted the frequency of the 13 isomorphic
triad classes (for detailed representation of the triad classes, refer to Figure
5http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ ml/weka/
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Figure 2: 13 isomorphic triad classes for analyses
2). We performed the same procedures with legitimate users and compared
the differences between the frequency of each triad class for both the spammer-
centric triads and the legitimate user-centric triads. We argue that the triad
frequencies of real social networks are different from those of spammers. The
triad frequencies of spammers are similar to those of random networks with the
same graph properties including the average indegree and the average outdegree.
For a given local network Gu of a user u as shown in Figure 3, we estimated
the number of occurrences for each triad class. Gu consists of social links be-
tween u and 1-hop neighborhoods of u. Suppose that u is following r1, r2 and r3
and is also followed by rr, r5 and r6. In this case, r1, r2 and r3 are “Followees”
of u. In the same manner, r4, r5 and r6 are “Followers” of u. Also, there are
directed social links between them (represented as red-colored links in Fig. 3).
To determine whether user u is a spammer or not, we analyzed user u’s social
graph Gu consisting of 7 nodes and 10 edges. This is a subgraph of a Twitter
social network, and every user can have his/her own social network.
To discover the phenomenon whereby spammer social networks comprise
subgraph features that are different from legitimate user social networks, we
compared spammer triad frequencies with those of legitimate users. For each
triad class i, the statistical triad occurrence is described by the Z-score Zi [29]
in Equation (2).
Zi = (Nspami− < Nlegiti >)/std(Nlegiti) (2)
where Nspami is the occurrence number of the triad class i in a spammer’s
network, and < Nlegiti > and std(Nlegiti) are the mean and standard deviations
of its appearances in the legitimate user networks, respectively. The TSP is
therefore the vector of the Z-scores that are normalized to length 1 in Equation
13
Figure 3: A user u’s social network graph Gu (red-colored edges and named nodes)
(3)
TSPi = Zi/(
∑
Zi
2)
1
2 (3)
To visualize this insight from network comparison, we computed the average
vector of TSP for random 1,000 spammers from the original dataset [15] and
normalized it. Similarly, we also computed Nlegiti based on random 1,000 legit-
imate users. We determined that the sample size 1,000 was large enough with
95% confidence level and 5% confidence interval.
Figure 4 compares the TSPs of spammers and legitimate users. Legiti-
mate users generally have more triads compared to spammers, meaning that
the neighbors of legitimate users are socially well connected with isomorphic
triad patterns; therefore, this phenomenon produced more triad counts overall.
Alternatively, spammers have lower triad counts than legitimate users because
their 1-hop neighbors are not likely to acquaint themselves with the other 1-hop
neighbors.
Since spammers usually select their followees randomly, there are few connec-
tions between spammers’ neighbors. Triad 021D, however, indicates exceptional
triad counts, whereby spammers have more 021D triads than legitimate users.
The 021D triad class represents the plural-following actions from a node. It also
represents link-farming activity. Since the actions of Follow spammers involve
the production of numerous out-links, their high 021D triad counts make sense.
The distinction between the TSPs of spammers and legitimate users therefore
explains why our TSP-detection approach is feasible. We give a statistical anal-
ysis of sensitivity of every proposed strategy in discussion section (Section 7).
In the following section, we provide a true-positive rate and false-negative rate
14
Figure 4: Average TSP of spammers and legitimate users. Error bar means standard deviation
of spammers TSPs.
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to support the excellence of this method.
As mentioned earlier, we randomly sampled sets of 1,000 spammers and 1,000
legitimate users from the original dataset [15] and conducted an experiment with
TSP. We determined that the sample size was large enough with 95% confidence
level and 5% confidence interval.
4.2. TSP-Filtering
The following process was used for the applicable value of the TSP-Filtering
based on the experiment. First, we obtained the mean and standard deviations
of each frequency for the triad class across all of the Twitter accounts. Since
1,000 legitimate users are sufficiently representative to support every Twitter
account (confidence level: 95%, confidence interval: 5%), we computed the mean
and standard deviations of the 1,000 randomly-sampled legitimate users. The
mean value of the triad class i is < Nlegiti > and standard deviation of the triad
class i with < Nlegiti > is std(Nlegiti), respectively. Figure shows the sampled
users local social networks and triad frequency normalization.
Figure 5: Triad frequency normalization
Second, we counted the spammer-triad frequencies and the legitimate user-
triad frequencies for every social-network subgraph of every user account; the
triad frequency represents the triad appearances in each user network. Then, we
normalized the frequencies with < Nlegiti > and std(Nlegiti) (Figure 5). In the
case of the spammer, we can use Equation (2); however, in the legitimate user’s
case, we can use the re-translated Equation (4), where Nspami is the occurrence
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Table 5: Performance evaluation using TSP-Filtering (w/o indegree and outdegree)
Classifier Type True Positive False Positive
J48
Spammer 91.0% 9.0%
Legitimate user 90.6% 9.4%
RandomForest
Spammer 92.1% 7.9%
Legitimate user 91.6% 8.4%
Table 6: Performance evaluation using TSP-Filtering (w/ indegree and outdegree)
Classifier Type True Positive False Positive
J48
Spammer 91.7% 8.3%
Legitimate user 90.8% 9.2%
RandomForest
Spammer 92.3% 7.7%
Legitimate user 92.4% 7.6%
number of the triad class i in a legitimate user’s network:
Zi = (Nlegiti− < Nlegiti >)/std(Nlegiti) (4)
Lastly, we computed each user’s TSP using Equation (3). A user’s TSP com-
prises 13 Z-scores of 13 triad classes. These 13 Z-scores could be informative for
a machine-learning mechanism. We also added two features for machine learn-
ing, namely the indegrees and outdegrees of each user based on the motivation
experiments.
4.3. Performance evaluation of TSP-Filtering
We conducted the experiment using J48 and RandomForest implemented in
Weka (10-fold validation). Table 5 shows the performance evaluation results for
the TSP method without indegrees and outdegrees. Table 6 shows the perfor-
mance evaluation results for the TSP method with indegrees and outdegrees.
On the other hand, Table 6 shows the performance evaluation results for the
TSP method with indegrees and outdegrees.
From Table 5, even without indegrees and outdegrees, TSP-Filtering for Ran-
domForest has a powerful spam-classification performance with 92.1%. From
Table 6, the proposed approach with indegrees and outdegrees has 92.3% true
positives and a lower proportion of false positives (7.6%) than Collusionrank
(9.9%). Unlike Collusionrank, which needs to analyze every link to rank ev-
ery node, our TSP approach is a fast and low-cost detection mechanism that
uses only the 1-hop-neighborhood network for each user. Therefore, the TSP
approach is a more lightweight and efficient mechanism for detecting follow
spammers in real time.
To define a preferred sequence of attributes, we measured the importance of
feature attributes based on information gain as shown in Table 7. In Table 7,
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Table 7: The importance of feature attributes based on information gain (TSP-Filtering)
Feature attributes Information Gain
021D 0.2867
021U 0.2556
021C 0.2366
111U 0.2267
201 0.1418
030T 0.1408
111D 0.1399
120D 0.136
120U 0.1075
120C 0.0871
300 0.0859
210 0.0794
030C 0.0465
feature attributes listed in descending order of information gain. Information
gain can be computed as follows:
InformationGain(C,A) = Entropy(C)− Entropy(C|A) (5)
In Equation (5), C represents the given class such as spammer and legitimate
user. A is the feature attribute. For example, InformationGain(spammer,021D)
refers to the amount of entropy decrease in a spammer class when the feature
attribute 021D is provided.
As we showed in the experiment results, 021D is the most significant factor
in classifying follow spammers because of its property of two out-edges. Follow
spammers tend to have many out-edges to legitimate users. This tendency is
presented naturally in 021D. The following attribute, 021U, is also significant
in classifying legitimate users because of its two in-edges. Legitimate users are
likely to have more followers than spammers at stable points of the Twitter SNS
system. Twitter is a very special SNS due to its subscription characteristics.
The more informative the users’ contents are, the more followers subscribe to
the user. Since most spammers upload advertisements or spamming contents on
their account, they have fewer followers than legitimate users. Understandably,
some legitimate Twitter users try to follow many users at the initial and transi-
tion points for subscriptions or other reasons. However, legitimate users at the
steady point have a larger number of indegrees (i.e., followers) than outdegrees
(i.e., friends) due to effective influence or fruitful contents because of the psy-
chology of popularity. In addition, the remaining features of TSP are gradually
reflected in the distinction between the follow spammers and legitimate users
because of the social-interaction.
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5. Twitter-spam Detection with Status Theory
5.1. Follow Spam Detection with Social Status (SS-filtering)
Based on signs of directed links derived from social media sites such as
Epinions, Slashdot, and Wikipedia, social status theory is first applied to predict
certain kinds of social relationships [27]. To find strong consistency in how
the model fits the data across other social networks as well as the power of
influence in Twitter using our TSP filtering scheme, we additionally propose
SS-Filtering for Twitter network analysis. Twitter has a special characteristic
whereby users follow (or subscribe to) other users and this can be translated
into the social-status theory. Generally, most Twitter users follow users who
are more influential than themselves. Especially on SNS, a more-influential user
is similar to a user with a high social status. When a legitimate user follows
others with a higher social status, is a spammer’s following pattern similar to a
legitimate user? We focused on the fact that spammers are likely to follow the
properties of a random network.
Our social-status-based intuition is derived from the following question: “Is
the following pattern of a spammer similar to that of a legitimate user when a
legitimate user follows others with a higher status?” We focused on the fact
that spammers are likely to follow the properties of a random network. In
fact, spammers have little knowledge of the social relations between legitimate
users. They tend to select target users randomly. One may argue that a strong
spammer is able to gather information regarding the social relations of legitimate
users. However, such social engineering has only partial and instantaneous
influence compared to the average and apparent influence of legitimate users.
5.2. SS-Filtering
A social-status spam-filtering system can compute the following metric based
on user u’s 2-hop social network. To apply Twitter to the status theory, we
defined the status of a user u as the ratio of the indegree (indegree(u)) to the
outdegree (outdegree(u)) of the user as shown in Equation (6).
status(u) = indegree(u)/outdegree(u) (6)
We then defined a positive link in Twitter as the probability that the user
follows another user of a higher status. Figure 6 shows the concept of social
status, positive link and negative link in status theory [27] and social balance
theory [7, 19, 20]. A positive link, ’+’ link means that a node X links to each
node A, B, C and D, who has higher social status than X. On the other hand, a
negative link, - means that the node D links to a node X, who has lower social
status than D.
The following Equation (7) is the expression of the positive link probability
(PLP) of a user u:
PLP (u) = Npos(u)/(Npos(u) + Nneg(u)) (7)
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Figure 6: Social status, positive link (orange link) and negative link (blue link)
Table 8: Average values comparison of social status-related features between legitimate user
and spammer
Social status-related features Legitimate user Spammer
Average status of a user 1.82 0.39
Average positive link probability (PLP) 0.83 0.91
Average status of followees ([0-1] scale) 0.05 0.0004
where Npos(u) means the number of positive links and Nneg(u) means the
number of negative links. We assumed that negative links include links between
same status. Additionally, we also consider the average status of followees.
Table 8 compares social status-related features between a legitimate user and
spammer.
We can derive interesting observations from Table 8. First, the average
status of a spammer is significantly lower than that of a legitimate user, and
this is attributed to the spammer’s link-farming property. In this observation
of the average status of a user, the two proposed schemes (TSP filtering and
SS filtering) have something in common. Second, the PLP of a spammer to
obtain a greater number of reciprocal followings is higher than that of a legiti-
mate user. Actually, this result counters our assumption that spammers select
followees randomly and the PLP of a spammer would be lower than that of
a legitimate user. However, this result is mainly due to the significantly low
status of spammer accounts (i.e., a good many outdegrees of each spammer ac-
count). We arrived at this conclusion from comparison of the average status
of followees. In Table 8, we computed the average status of followees by [0-1]
scale normalization for measurable comparison. Compared to the average status
of legitimate users’ followees, spammers’ followees have definitely lower status.
Therefore, though the PLP of spammers is higher than that of legitimate users,
most spammers follow users with low status. This provides sufficient evidence
for our assumption. This intuitively indicates that a spammer usually targets
users who are not highly influential due to lacking real social networks. Alter-
natively, a legitimate user follows (or subscribes to) influential users or their
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Table 9: Performance evaluation using SS-Filtering (w/o indegree and outdegree)
Classifier Type True Positive False Positive
J48
Spammer 90.4% 9.6%
Legitimate user 82.9% 17.1%
RandomForest
Spammer 88.6% 11.4%
Legitimate user 85.4% 14.6%
online friends as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Comparison between legitimate users and spammers for average status of followees
Figure 8 shows the relationship between an average followee status and the
PLP, demonstrating wide variations among the average followee statuses of
legitimate users. This illustrates that legitimate users follow the properties of a
real social network, whereas spammers do not.
5.3. Performance evaluation of SS-Filtering
For this experiment, we used the same dataset containing samples of spam-
mers and legitimate users from the previous section. We used the user’s status,
average status of followees, PLP, indegree, and outdegree as the feature vectors.
We conducted the experiment using J48 and RandomForest in Weka (10-fold
validation). The following Tables (Table 9 and Table 10) are the result of the
performance evaluations of SS-Filtering considering indegree and outdegree (i.e.,
without or with).
Consequently, the proposed approach also shows a good proportion of true-
positives (91.9%) and a lower amount of false positives (9.7%) compared to
Collusionrank. Similar to the TSP method using the 1-hop-network of each
user, the SS method uses only the small 2-hop-network for each user. These
lightweight schemes make the spam-filtering process much faster. Considering
that Collusionrank uses every link and node for computation, our detection
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Figure 8: Green squares indicate legitimate user accounts and red triangles mean spammer
accounts.
Table 10: Performance evaluation using SS-Filtering (w/ indegree and outdegree)
Classifier Type True Positive False Positive
J48
Spammer 88.0% 12.0%
Legitimate user 90.0% 10.0%
RandomForest
Spammer 91.9% 8.1%
Legitimate user 90.3% 9.7%
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Table 11: The importance of feature attributes based on information gain (SS-Filtering)
Feature attribute Information Gain
A user’s status 0.386
Followee’s status 0.327
PLP 0.107
Table 12: Performance evaluation using Cascaded-Filtering
Classifier Type True Positive False Positive
J48
Spammer 94.0% 6.0%
Legitimate user 92.4% 7.6%
RandomForest
Spammer 96.3% 3.7%
Legitimate user 94.3% 5.7%
mechanism using the social status is as efficient as the TSP approach in real
time spam filtering. Table 11 shows the importance of feature attributes based
on information gain with Equation (5).
In SS-Filtering, the user’s status is the most significant feature similar with
TSP-Filtering. This is because spammers have fewer indegrees than outdegrees.
Therefore, the status of a spammer is lower than that of a legitimate user.
However, the followee’s average status was also important as well as the user’s
status. Normally, a legitimate user subscribes to informative users’ accounts,
and the status of these users is likely to be high due to their many followers. This
means that legitimate users follow users with higher status than themselves. On
the other hand, spammers tend to select and follow legitimate users randomly.
As a result, their followees (targets) may have a lower status than themselves.
6. Twitter-spam Detection with Cascaded approach (Cascaded-Filtering)
In previous sections, we proposed TSP-Filtering and SS-Filtering using par-
tial information (i.e., up to the 2-hop social network of a user) for lightweight
and real-time spammer detection. Both algorithms have fewer false positives
than Collusionrank, but their true positives are not superior to Collusionrank.
Therefore, we suggest a hybrid approach (Cascaded-Filtering) that utilizes every
feature attribute used by both TSP-Filtering and SS-Filtering. We conducted
an experiment on each of 1,000 legitimate user and 1,000 spammer account with
TSP features (TSP of 13 triad classes), social status features (the user’s status,
average status of followee, PLP), indegree and outdegree. Table 12 shows the
performance evaluation results using Cascaded-Filtering.
7. Discussion
7.1. Overall Performance Comparison
In this paper, we compared three Follow spam filtering mechanisms (TSP-
filtering, SS-filtering and Cascaded-Filtering) with Collusionrank. Collusion-
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Table 13: Overall performance comparison
Collusionrank
TSP-
Filtering
SS-
Filtering
Cascaded-
Filtering
True Positive
(Spammer)
94% 92.3% 91.9% 96.3%
False Positive
(Legitimate user)
9.9% 7.6% 9.7% 5.7%
rank is the first Follow spam-targeted filtering algorithm published. It is a
PageRank-based algorithm, so it can be applied when the spam-filtering sys-
tem contains information on every Twitter social network. We propose the
TSP-filtering and SS-filtering methods, both of which can be applied with only
the 2-hop social network of a user; this is the most powerful feature of these
methods. Table 13 shows the overall comparison of the three methods with
Collusionrank.
Both TSP-filtering and SS-filtering have lower true-positive rates and more
favorable false-positive rates. However, we are convinced that our detection
mechanism is more effective for the following reasons. In general, for SNSs such
as Twitter and Facebook, real-time spam detection is the most important is-
sue. Since spammers simultaneously disseminate numerous spamming contents
to SNSs, fast and immediate filtering with minimal information is needed to
prevent spamming. To detect spam contents promptly, a lightweight compu-
tational cost is essential. TSP-filtering and SS-filtering identify spammers by
using small subgraphs with up to 2-hop social networks for a user. On the other
hand, Collusionrank requires more than 24GB of RAM to perform computa-
tion on a dataset with 1,963,263,821 edges. Therefore, for application to the
entire Twitter-user population, it is not efficient to use every node and edge.
We therefore suggest a divide-and-conquer approach like our TSP-filtering and
SS-filtering methods for immense SNSs.
Another issue is the false-positive rate. For the reliability and convenience
of SNSs, a spam-filtering system should not filter legitimate users as spam-
mers, since this blocks users’ utilization abilities and leads to notoriety and
systemic failure. In comparison with the false-positive rate, compensation of
the true-positive rate of TSP-filtering and SS-filtering is natural and easier.
Spam-reporting services are incorporated into the design of most SNSs for the
detection of content abusers, and this complementary tool could be helpful
for the detection of subtle spamming actions. Accordingly, TSP-filtering and
SS-filtering could be practical spam-filtering mechanisms for use under SNS
conditions.
The performance of Cascaded-Filtering, which employs every feature at-
tribute used in TSP-Filtering and SS-Filtering, is superior to the other three
schemes including CollusionRank. This scheme can accurately detect more
spammers and block or suspend less legitimate users. Consequently, this re-
sult supports the idea that there is a distinction between the legitimate user’s
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Table 14: True Positive, False Negative and Recall of every suggested strategy
True Positive False Negative Recall
In/Out degree 0.808 0.804 0.501
TSP-Filtering 0.923 0.924 0.500
SS-Filtering 0.919 0.903 0.504
Cascaded-Filtering 0.963 0.943 0.505
social network and the spammer’s social network. Especially, this scheme does
not require the full social network information, including users that are not di-
rectly related to the account, to determine whether a specific user is a spammer
or not. Moreover, for the service provider, half the number of false positives
of Collusionrank is pretty attractive to ensure a reliable and convenient SNS
system.
Figure 9: ROC curve of (a) TSP-Filtering and (b) SS-Filtering (c) Cascaded-Filtering (X axis
: False positive , Y axis : True positive)
Figure 9 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and the
Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) for every proposed approach. Due to its high
true positive and low false positive values, Cascaded-Filtering has the highest
AUC. To compare with Collusionrank, we estimated the AUC of Collusionrank
using its true positive and false positive values. Consequently, compared to
Collusionrank (AUC=0.92), our approaches are competitive and require much
less social network information.
7.2. Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 10 shows a statistical analysis to evaluate the sensitivity of the TSP-
detection strategy.
We computed the recall(sensitivity) as following equation :
recall = TruePositives/(TruePositives + FalseNegatives) (8)
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Figure 10: Sensitivity of the proposed detection strategies
To sum up, from table 14, two proposed approaches, SS-Filtering and Cascaded-
Filtering, show better sensitivity than spam classification using In/Out de-
gree only. Actually, TSP-Filtering has slightly lower sensitivity than those
approaches, it counters this limitation with both high true positive and false
negative. Cascaded-Filtering, which is the hybrid approach using every feasible
features, shows the best performance at sensitivity with superior true positive
and false positive.
7.3. Complexity Analysis
Following pseudo-code is TSP-Filtering and it consists of two steps: Triad
census algorithm and Triad Significance Profile computation algorithm. At
first, we modified input of Triad census algorithm [2] to apply to two-hop input
subnetwork. G = (V,E) is the two-hop directed subnetwork of a user.
Algorithm 1 computes frequencies of 16 isomorphic triad types. In our work,
we used only 13 isomorphic triads because triad types with isolated nodes are
counted frequently so that this interrupts observing significance of triads. From
this algorithm, we can get frequencies of 13 isomorphic triad types of given
graph G. TSP-Filtering get 2-hop neighborhood social network of a certain user
as input. This algorithm has the complexity O(m) and m is the number of edges
in the graph G. In algorithm 1, TriType means how many nodes are connected
each other. This indicates that an isolate node exists when TriType is 2. [2]
used the concept of Tricode to count triad efficiently, but we dont explain detail
of the concept in this paper.
Algorithm 2 computes Z-score and TSP of a certain input user. For input
attributes, this algorithm has input vectors consisting of mean and standard
deviation of legitimate users triad frequency. These attributes could be got at
preprocessing phase, which computes mean and standard deviation of legiti-
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Algorithm 1 TriadCensus
INPUT : G
for i:=1 to 16 do
Ni = 0
end for
for v ∈ V do
if u ∈ v then
S:= Neighbor(u) ∪ Neighbor(v) \ {u,v}
if Link(u,v) and Link(v,u) then
TriType:=3
else
TriType:=2
end if
N [TriType]:=N [TriType] + n - |S| - 2
for each w ∈ S do
if u < w ∨ (v < w ∧ w < u ∧ ¬Link(v,w) then
TriType:=TriType[Tricode(v,u,w)]
N [TriType] := N [TriType]+1
end if
end for
end if
end for
sum:=0
for i:=2 to 16 do
sum:=sum+N [i]
end for
N [1]:= (1/6)n(n-1)-sum
return N
Algorithm 2 Triad Significance Profile
INPUT : N , < Nlegiti >, std(Nlegit)
for i:1 to 13 do
Zi=(N [i]-< Nlegiti >)/std(Nlegiti )
end for
for i:1 to 13 do
TSPi=Zi/(
∑
Zi
2)
1
2 )
end for
return TSP
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Table 15: Complexity analysis
Collusionrank TSP-Filtering SS-Filtering
Cascaded-
Filtering
Time complexity O(N+M) O(m) O(n) O(m+n)
Space complexity O(N) O(m) O(n) O(m+n)
mate users for the training value. Since our work is to classify spammers from
legitimate users, we should compare the users triad frequency N (testing value)
to legitimate users triad frequency Nlegit (training value). This algorithm has
time complexity O(1) because of a simple normalization process. Therefore,
TSP-Filtering is a combined algorithm of TriadCensus algorithm and TSP al-
gorithm. The novelty of our work is that we used a users 2-hop neighborhood
social network as initial input. Also, we compare each users census to overall
legitimate users to observe overrepresentation and underrepresentation in each
isomorphic triad. Overrepresentation and underrepresentation of triads could
be the distinct features to classify spammers from legitimate users. So, TSP-
Filtering has O(m) time complexity for a target user. Following pseudo-code is
SS-Filtering. Actually, in preprocessing phase, we can compute the status of a
user with his/her indegree and outdegree. Since we defined the status of a user
as the ratio of the indegree to the outdegree of the user (Equation (6)), we just
update three values indegree, outdegree and status in real time case. So, we
only need positive link probability (PLP ) of a user. The simple algorithm for
PLP is as follows. Status means a table with status of every user in G.
Algorithm 3 Positive Link Probability
INPUT : G, Status
PositiveLink:=0
for each u ∈ Neighbor(v) do
if Status[v] < Status[u] then
PositiveLink:=PositiveLink+1
end if
end forPLP :=PositiveLink/|Neighbor(v)|
return PLP
Algorithm 3 computes the ratio of the number of neighbors with higher status
than user v to the number of neighbors of user v. Since SS-Filtering highly
depends on preprocessing phase, this simple algorithm has the complexity O(n)
when n means the number of users in G.
Additionally, Table ?? shows the complexity analysis of the proposed schemes
and Collusionrank. Actually, since our work is for each users 2-hop neigh-
borhood social network, complexity comparison with Collusionrank seems to
be ironic. To sum up, Collusionrank is for classifying large number of spam-
mer accounts from whole social network, but TSP-Filtering, SS-Filtering and
Cascaded-Filtering is for determining if a user is spammer or not. n means the
number of user (nodes) in 2-hop neighborhood social network and m is the num-
ber of relation (edges) in 2-hop neighborhood social network. Also, N means
28
the number of every users (nodes) in whole social network and M means the
number of every relations (edges) in whole social network. This table showed
that our approaches need less computation than Collusionrank.
8. Future Work
8.1. Dynamic follow spammer detection
First of all, camouflage attack, which uses compromised user account to
disseminate spam contents, could be one of the interesting future work. To
solve the camouflage attack problem, unsupervised scheme can be considered
for detecting newly occurred spammers to the proposed scheme (i.e., unsuper-
vised scheme based on cascaded social information). For example, we can select
self-organizing map (SOM) among machine learning algorithms for mapping
between spammer labeled with supervised scheme based on cascaded social in-
formation and new spammer based on unsupervised scheme.
In detail, SOM is one of clustering algorithms using Euclidean distance con-
cept between source and destination. If we train spammer patterns with cas-
caded social information scheme as a supervised concept that can be a par-
tial part of pre-defined map of SOM for processing and clustering new input
automatically as a unsupervised concept. SOM calculates Euclidean distance
between spammer account with cascaded social information and new Twitter
account to check whether the tendency of new account is closer to spammer
or legitimate. In each epoch, SOM can update the tendency of each account
based on Euclidean distance dynamically and distinguish between time-varying
spammer and legitimate based on clustering map. In future, we will apply SOM
or other optimal solution for detecting dynamic spammer according to time.
8.2. Generalized applications of the proposed scheme
In the view of social behavior, people have different social networking style
based on their purpose of using SNS. For example, spammers make numerous
following links to unspecified individuals with the aim of spreading spam con-
tents. On the other hand, if someone wants to make friends in SNS, they would
carefully select users as friends based on a personal preference and closeness.
And finally, these social links made by various users could be interpreted in
cascaded social information.
As shown in our experiment, cascaded social information and its structural
analysis suggest various future application in social network security. In future
work, we are to find a correlation between various behavior patterns of using
SNS and cascaded social information. The behavioral patterns of using SNS
can be more specified by various types regardless of spammer and legitimate.
One of the types is a false rumor in SNS. Since false rumor is unverified and
unconfirmed information, it seems very attractive sometimes according to its
degree of sensationalism. In general, false rumors are spread widely in the com-
munity and proven to be false eventually. However, we need to focus on users
who spread false rumors in the view of their behavioral patterns. If someone
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has high social status in SNS, he/she tends to hesitate to spread rumors because
he/she is anxious for impairing his dignity or credibility by spreading misinfor-
mation. Therefore, we could guess that false rumors are spread by users who
arent related to social credibility or reputation. In conclusion, false rumor de-
tection based on cascaded social information could be one of great topics for
future generalized application.
9. Conclusion
On Twitter, one of the most popular social networking services (SNSs), a
new kind of spamming strategy has emerged known as Follow spam. The goal
of this paper is to classify follow spammers by utilizing social network proper-
ties in the individuals local social network. To solve this problem, we proposed
three novel cascaded social information based spam detection mechanisms (TSP-
Filtering and SS-Filtering) and a hybrid approach (Cascaded-Filtering). These
approaches analyze and exploit social network properties such as Triad Signif-
icance Profile (TSP) and Social Status (SS). We conducted large-scale experi-
ments on real Twitter datasets. The results from analyzing individual-related
small local social networks support our assumption that a spammers social net-
work is different from a legitimate users social network. We compared our ap-
proaches to Collusionrank, the PageRank-based representative algorithm of the
follow spam detection. Cascaded-Filtering was found to be the most competitive
and superior approach while requiring much less social network information. In
conclusion, with a high proportion of true positives (96.3%) and low amount of
false positives (5.7%), our approaches are very secure and practical mechanisms
that can be applied as real time spam detection systems.
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